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An Analysis
B~Ronald Walters
"
T'he resignation of U.S.Ambassador. to the United NationsAndrew Young. is significant, not only for the inci-t dent itself, but for its catalytic effect
upon the development of a Middle East
policy in the Black community and the at-
.tendent ramifications this carries for do-
mestic Black-Jewish relations.
While it is a fact that on August 15, 1979,
Young submitted his "non-negotiable"
resignation to President Carter, accounts
of this event rarely provide the context
within which it occurred. This was a con-
text essentially defined by the attempt of
the U.S. to fulfill one of two objectives of
the Camp David accords by bringing the
Palestinians into discussions on the ques-
'tion of U.S.-Egyptian-Israel i proposals for
:their "autonomy."
One early actor in this diplomacy was
U S. Ambassador to Austria, Milton Wolf,
an industrialist and prominent member of
the Cleveland (Ohio) Jewish community,
who was reported to have had three "un-
authorized" meetings with representatives
of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) previous to the Young resignation
The first two of these meetings occurred
in the spring of 1979andwere said to have
been "social" in nature, but the third ap-
pears to have been more substantive.
State Department spokesman TomRes-
ton said that Wolf was contacted by Isa
Sartawi, an aide to PLO leader Yasser
Arafat, to "clarify the group's position on a
certain issue," saying that Wolf simply
listened but made no comment and took
no substantive position. He (Wolf) merely
repeated the standing U.S. policy of pro-
hibition on recognition of or negotiations
with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's
right to survival. Then, appearing to pro-
vide the full weight of State Department
protection to Wolf's activities, Reston
added: "I want to stress that Ambassador
Wolf on no occasion has sought any meet-
ingswith or any dialogue with members of
the PLO." (Washington Star, August 16,
1979)
Although the substance of these dis-
cussions have not been made public by
any U.S. sources, the Jerusalem Post re-
ported that the meeting was "lengthy and
detailed." More importantly, the last meet-
ing took place just before Arafat himself
flew to Austria for a meeting with Austrian
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Willy
Brandt, former chancellor of West Ger-
many, in early July 1979. This meeting
produced a formal protest from the Gov-
ernment of Israel to the Austrian Govern-
ment but no condemnation of the role of
Ambassador Wolf. (Newsweek, Septem-
ber 3, 1979).
Meanwhile, also in July, Ambassador
Young was conducting del icate negotia-
tions on a resolution in the UN which
called for a halt to Israeli settlements on
the West Bank, but at the last minute, the
U S. representatives were instructed to
abstain. Youngexplained that the PLOwas
considering an endorsement of UN Res-
olution 242 (a policy objective of several
U.S. Administrations), but that it needed
some tangible encouragement, which was
denied them by the U.S. abstention.
(Newsweek, August 27, 1979). A second
resolution, sponsored by Kuwait, was
drafted that affirmed both Resolution 242
(which contains the important provision
on the legitimacy and integrity of Israel's
right to exist as a state), and the right of
the Palestinians to a state. Young's view,
however, was that this resolution would
provoke an acrimonious debate in the
Security Council (at its August 23 meet-
ing) when the U.S. would be in the chair,
and would force the U.S. to cast an em-
barrassing veto of the proposal. He, there-
fore, set out to negotiate support for the
procedural step of putting off the debate.
Ambassador Abdullah Yacoub Bishara
of Kuwait was approached by Young with
the suggestion of postponing the debate
but Bishara refused, saying that the rec-
ommendation of Shedi Labib Terzi, the
PLO observer to the UN, would be influ-
ential in such a procedural matter with
NATIONAl
other members of the Arab bloc. This led 7
to the crucial meeting of July 26.
The meeting was discovered, the At-
lanta Constitution reported, by Israeli in-
telligence agents who were following
Terzi, and apparently leaked the informa-
tion to Newsweek reporter Milan J. Kubic
in Jersualem. When Newsweek inquired
about the meeting with the State Depart-
ment, Assistant Secretary of StateCharles
W. Maynes telephoned Young, who re-
sponded with the official version that the
contact with Terzi was "inadvertent" and
that no substantive matters were dis-
cussed. In Young's words, "Nobody was
misled everybody knew what was going
on," that he was attempting to secure a
postponement of the debate on the reso-
lution.
Although reports of such Israeli intelli-
gence operations in theU.S.as suggested
by the Atlanta Constitution have been de-
nied by U.S.officials, Young later asserted
that he had read a "virtual verbatim" ac-
count of the meeting at Ambassador
Bishara's house in a State Department
report, which was circulating at the
highest levels as of July 30, four days
after the meeting and two weeks before
his reprimand by Secretary of StateCyrus
Vance for the meeting. (New York Times,
August 19, 1979).
Nevertheless, Young said that when he
was made aware that his "official ver-
sion" of the Terzi meeting was not be-
lieved, he told the full story to the Israeli
representative to the UN, Yehuda Blum,
so that Ambassador Blum would not be
under the impression that Young had
really lied to him about the meeting. Blum
reported the substance of his discussion
with Young to the Israeli Government,
whereupon it issued a public protest to
the U.S. This protest, together with a re-
port of the meeting, reportedly angered
Secretary Vance, who called Young to a
meeting at theWhite Housewith the Presi-
dent on August 15 under awelter of press
reports which detailed the meeting be-
tween Young and the PLO, and many of
which included calls for his resignation by
journalists and prominent members of the
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8 Jewish communities in New York and
Florida. Young carried his resignation let-
ter to the White House on the morning of
August 15 and the announcement was
made by him at an emotional press con-
ference at the State Department later that
day.
U. S. Middle East Policy
One of the major effects of the Young
resignation was its impact upon the tenor
of U.S. policy in the Middle East, first
through actually achieving the objective
of postponing the debate on the resolu-
tion offensive to the U.S.,and second, by
opening up the possibility of a dialogue
with the PLO as a legitimate fact of U S.
diplomacy in the area.
With regard to the UNSecurity Council
resolution, the U. S.attempted to seize the
initiative by sending Robert Strauss, spe-
cial U S envoy for Middle East,on a mis-
sion to obtain a compromise resolution
two days after Young's resignation. Al-
though his trip was previously planned,
his immediate mission was to propose to
both Israel and Egypt that they support a
new U. S.-sponsored resolution calling for
Palestinian rights, but stopping short of
endorsing the idea of a Palestinian state
while upholding the language of UNRes-
olutions 242 and 338. The initiative failed
as both Prime Minister Begin and Presi-
dent Sadat vetoed the proposal. Then
Strauss said himself that the mission had
been ill-advised and that it was better to
let the peace process between Egypt and
Israel work its course and not attempt a
forced intervention of the Palestinian issue
which would possibly endanger their co-
operation. (Newsweek, September 3,
1979). Thus, the U.S. resolution was
withdrawn.
An operative resolution on the Palestin-
ian issue was proposed by Senegal in the
Security Council meeting of August 23,
after some debate on the language which
contained references to Palestinian "self-
determination, national independence
and sovereignty." The Arab delegates, in-
cluding PLO's Terzi, declined to bring the
resolution to a vote. Bishara suggested
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this was done as a goodwill gesture to
Andrew Young by saying: "we cannot
imagine Ambassador Young being blem-
ished with a veto." (Newsweek, Septem-
ber 3, 1979). "We agreed to postpone the
vote out of deference to him. My only con-
cern was the enhancement of the status of
Ambassador Young." (New York Times,
August 25, 1979).Simi lar sentiments were
expressed by Terzi.
While these sentiments were expressed
which avowed deference to Young, it was
also clear that another opportunity to press
the vote would arise in the near future,
and that an important intermediate objec-
tive of the Arabs had been achieved-an
enhancement of the status of the PLO.
Given this fact, the additional time be-
came useful in cultivating allies outside of
the Third World bloc and in enhancing the
status of Arafat at the September non-
aligned nations conference in Havana,
Cuba. In this ironic way, the foreign policy
objective of the U.S. was also achieved.
The second objective of finding a
formula for bringing the Palestinians into
the peace talks would be more difficult,
and for an appropriate analysis one must
review the results of the Camp David ac-
cords. The Camp David Summit of Sep-
tember 5-17,1978 resulted in two agree-
ments, a so-called Framework for Peace
in the Middle East and a Framework for
the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Be-
tween Egypt and Israel.The former agree-
mentwas essentially concerned with three
issues: the Palestinian "autonomy" ques-
tion, the principles which would guide the
approach to peace treaties between Israel
and other states in the region (such as
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), and the con-
duct of Egypt and Israel in relation to these
issues (substantially established by their
separate peace treaty).
The peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel was signed in Washington, D.C.
on March 26,1979, thus fulfilling the first
"Framework" agreement, and pursuant to
the second agreement at Camp David,
talks were started between the U.S.,
Egypt, and Israel with respect to the
Palestinian question. The specific pro-
posal contained in the Framework for
Peace in the Middle East relative to the
Palestine question calls for four-power
negotiations between Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan and elected representatives of the
Palestinian peoples of the West Bank and
Gaza. So far, however,Jordan has refused
to recognize the Camp David agreements
and the accords have been denounced
by the PLO and also by pro-Western
Palestinian leaders. For example, the
moderate mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij,
has said: "We'll accept nothing less than
complete Israeli evacuation of this area
and Palestinian statehood. And remember
my words: eventually, the Israelis and the
U.S.will have to talk with the PLO." (News-
week, September 3, 1979). Also, King
Hussein of Jordan used the forum pro-
vided by the non-aligned meeting in
Havana to again denounce the Camp
David agreement and to call for a
Palestinian state.
That Andrew Young was following a
line of U.S. policy with respect to the
Palestinian issue has been made clear
from the evidence of the talks between
Wolf and representatives of the PLO. But
in addition, press reports indicated that
the meeting between Arafat and Chancel-
lor Kreisky and Brandt, was characterized
by Arafat as part of a U.S. plan to involve
the Palestinians in the Camp David peace
negotiations. (Washington Post, August
13, 1979). The reaction of Israel was swift
as its foreign policy spokesmen began to
suggest that they feared the U. S. would
not veto the intended Arab sponsored
UN resolution to be considered on Au-
gust 23. At the same time, the PLO Cen-
tral Council, which was meeting in Syria,
affirmed on August 11 that the UN resolu-
tion must call for an independent Palestin-
ian state.
Repeated Israeli questioning of the
proposed UN resolution and a possible
shift of U.S. policy toward the PLO be-
cause of the prospect of oil sanctions by
Arab states or the Palestinians them-
selves, led to aWhite House meeting be-
tween Secretary Vance, President Carter
and Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
Ephraim Evron. The 90-minute session
reaffirmed the policy of the U.S. toward
the Middle East when at its conclusion
Secretary Vance said: "I want to state
categorically that there has been no
change in our policy toward Israel. It re-
mains our pol icy to work toward a compre-
hensive peace settlement which is based
on UN. Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338." (L.A. Times, August 9, 1979).
Apparently unsatisfied with the assur-
ances by Vance, editors of major Ameri-
can newspapers asked the President
about his view of the Palestinian question
a few days later, and he responded: "I am
against any creation of a separate Pales-
tinian state. I don't think it would be good
for the Palestinians. I don't think it would
be good for Israel. Idon't think it would be
good for the Arab neighbors of such a
state." (New York Times, August 12, 1979)
In add ition, much has been made of the
1975 policy enunciated by former Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger relating to a
prohibition on relations with the PLO.The
document, a Memorandum of Agreement
between the U.S.and Israel relating to the
1975 Geneva Peace Conference, states
in part: "The United States will continue
toadhere to its present pol icy with respect
to the Palestine Liberation Organization,
whereby it will not recognize or negotiate
with the Palestine Liberation Organization,
so long as the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization does not recognize Israel's right to
exist and does not accept Security Coun-
cil Resolution 242 and 338. The United
States Govemment will consult fully and
seek to concert its position and strategy
at the Geneva Peace Conference on this
issuewith the Government of Israel."
While the prohibition on contacts is
described in the memorandum as a "pol-
icy" it may have had the status of a "prac-
tice" in the absence of any other evidence
to the contrary. Also, it is clear that this
agreement was drafted in relation to the
impend ingGenevaPeaceConference be-
tween the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
which may have the legal effect of limiting
its application to other diplomatic
situations.
However, despite Kissinger's role, the
practice or policy was explicitly reaf-
firmed by President Carter in the context
of his recent assurances to Israel that the
U.S.had not in fact changed its policy. He
said: "I will not deal with the PLO unless
they do two things: accept the right of
Israel to exist, which they have not yet
been willing to acknowledge, and accept
the fact that United Nations Resolution
242 is a document binding on them. They
have got to accept 242 and accept the
right of Israel to exist. This is the commit-
ment we have made. We have never devi-
ated from it. We are not going to deviate
from it." (New York Times, August 12,
1979).
Against this background, it is important
to point out that at the closing minutes of
the August 23 session, after the with-
drawal of the resolution, Ambassador
Young made what amounted to a farewell
speech as chairman of the Security Coun-
cil session. In his remarks,he emotionally
referred to the policy which prohibited
contacts with the PLO "It's a ridiculous
policy of not talking to the PLO," suggest-
ing equally that it was ridiculous for many
states at the table not to have relations
with Israel. (New York Times, August 25,
1979).
It is worth noting that the lack of precise
definition on whether or not the contact
between Young and Terzi constituted a
"procedural" or "substantive" contact and
what kinds of contacts were specifically
prohibited by reference to the Kissinger
memorandum and subsequent statements
by the Carter Administration, give the ap-
pearance of the Administration having
made up a definition to fit its embarrass-
ment in the Young case. In fact, the State
Department spokesman said the ban re-
fers to "any substantive contact" between
the PLO and U.S. representatives. (Wash-
ington Post, August 15, 1979). But the
meaning of "substantive" is asyet unclear.
Black Politics
The second major impact of Ambassador
Young's resignation was felt in the Black
community which, accurately or not,
Young had come to represent in his at- 9
tempts at building linkages to Africa and
the Third World. The reason for the reac-
tion lay in the fact that Young, more than
any other person in the Black community,
had played an early and fundamental role
in bringing Blacks into the Carter electoral
column in the presidential election of
1976. It was he who urged other Black
pol itical leaders to stay with Carter after
the Florida primary. Then he smoothed the
way for Carter's nomination by working
behind the scenes to quiet Black discon-
tent over Carter's use of the term "ethnic
purity" in regard to neighborhood resi-
dence, and helped Carter gain access to
local Black neighborhoods. Having
played such a role, Young gained a spe-
cial place in the Carter entourage and
esteem from the cand idate and later the
President.
Black voters, however, expected that
Youngwould use this prominence and his
political influence as a member of the
U.S. Congress to broker badly needed
benefits from the Administration in the
domestic arena. They became somewhat
bewildered and upset when Young took
all of his credibility and placed it in the
lowly regarded [at that time] United Na-
tions job at the request of the President.
This was, many felt, an unfortunate con-
cession of dubious value to the national
Black community. But Young's activities
as a former aide to Martin Luther King,
gave him strong ties to the Black commu-
nity, and his performance at the UN.
actually boosted his image.
Notwithstanding his new venue and
visibility, there was a great deal of ambi-
guity in the Black community about Young.
When he said that the British were "rac-
ists," that there were "hundreds perhaps
thousands of political prisoners in the
U.S.," that the Cubans were "a force for
stability in Angola," and that Ayatolla
Khomeini was a "saint," there was instant
identification with these statements in the
Black community, and the occasional
conflict they produced provided Blacks
with the periodic opportunity to rally to
Young's defense.
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10 At the same time, there was considera-
ble feeling that both his status as an am-
bassador and his former role as a minister
and disciple of non-violence, would limit
his understanding of why African libera-
tion movements turned to armed struggle
to win their political independence-es-
pecially in Southern Africa. Perhaps the
crux of this problem was his attempt to
approach what had been declared a revo-
lutionary situation in terms and strategies
of the American civil rights movement.
Equally disconcerting to the liberation
movements and their supporters in the
United States and around the world was
his attitude toward the role of American
businesses in Southern Africa, and his
role, together with that of his deputy,
Donald McHenry, in attempting to set the
terms for peace negotiations in Zimbabwe
and Namibia, which were not always fa-
vorable to the interest of the liberation
movements.
Nevertheless, the day following his
resignation, a hastily assembled meeting
of Black leaders- Vernon Jordan, Coretta
King, Bayard Rustin, Eddie Williams and
others-was convened in New York. A
relatively weak one-pace statement was
issued after themeeting. It upheld Young's
integrity and accompl ishments, ex-
pressed regret at his resignation and at
the President's acceptance of it, ques-
tioned the difference between Young's
treatment and that of Ambassador Wolf,
and expressed the hope that this incident
would not "exacerbate tensions between
the Black and Jewish communities."
At the time of his resignation, the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference,
SCLC (the organization with which he
had been strongly identified in the past)
was having its annual meeting in Norfolk,
Va., and Young had been scheduled to
give the dinner address the following
evening. His cancellation of that address
brought the Rev. Jesse Jackson into that
role. In his remarks, Jackson correctly
identified one source of anger in the
Black community as he pointed to the
strong possibility that Young was forced
outof his UN position by powerful Jewish
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interestgroups in the country. He also tied
this to the prevailing disaffection with
Jews, which Black people had come to
feel as a result of their opposition to is-
sues such as school busing, job and edu-
cational quotas as expressed in the Bakke,
OeFunis and Weber cases, and their pas-
sive acceptance of the role played by the
Israeli Government in South Africa.
But the anger was also directed toward
the reason for Young's resignation, as
Joseph Lowery, president of SCLC, said:
"If we have to maintain your (Jews) friend-
ship by refraining from speaking to Arabs,
then that friendship must be reassessed."
(Washington Star, August 16, 1979).Jack-
son was of the view that Young had been
"made the fall guy for a shift in U.S. Pol-
icy" toward the Middle East. A chorus of
statements by other figures followed, but
two decisions were made, one to call a
meeting of the national Black member-
ship, the second was for the SCLC to have
a meeting with both the PLOobserver and
the Israeli representative to the UN the
following week.
The rationale for the meetings was is-
sued by Congressman Walter Fauntroy of
the District of Columbia, and chairman of
the Board of SCLC. He suggested that
Blacks should become "students of the
Middle East" situation because our own
vital interest in peace were grounded in
the realization that continued conflict
there would jeopardize U.S. energy re-
sources from that regionwhich would have
a disadvantageous impact upon Blacks
economically, and perhaps dispropor-
tionately affect the actual lives of Blacks
in the event the U.S. is drawn into a war
there. The specific goals for the two meet-
ings were listed as follows:
The PLO Meeting
• Understand their position
• Communicate our support of their hu-
man rights
• Communicate our continued support
of non-violence as the most accepta-
ble means of resolving conflict and af-
fecting change
~~~--------~-------------------------------------.-- --
• Encourage them to recognize the hu-
man rights of the Israelis, includin8
their right to exist as a sovereign state,
The Israel Meeting
• Reiterate our support of Israel as a free
sovereign state
• Clarify our support of PLO human
rights
• Communicate our concern about
Israel's relations with SouthAfrica
• Discuss com.monobjectives of ending
racial and religious discrimination.
The beginning of the week following
Young's resignation, the SCLC delega-
tion met with both the PLO representative
Terzi and Israel's UN Ambassador Blum
inNewYorkon the same day. Themeeting
with Terzi was relatively cordial, ending
with the PLO official thanking the SCLC
for their understanding of their plight, but
refusing commitment on the question of
recognition of Israel or forswearing violent
tactics, for the moment. In contrast, the
meeting with Blum was more tense, with
Blum appearing to patronize the SCLC
delegation for its lack of experience in
Middle East politics and its temerity for
meeting with the PLO representative.
Blum's subsequent statements after the
meeting deplored the fact of the SCLC
meeting with Terzi.
(It is patently ironic that it has been the
long experience of Blacks which has led
them to see the PLO in a different light
thanothers, rather than their inexperience.
And Young was reflecting this experience
when he identified, in his resignation
valedictory at the State Department, with
the PLO as an "oppressed people." Simi-
larly, the principle of self-determination
has loomed largest in the struggle of
Blacks in the U.S. to support the just
aspirations of Africans for independent
status from the earl iest sti rrings of Marcus
Garvey to the present day struggle in
Southern Africa. How then, one must ask,
is it possible for Blacks to betray this
legacy when it comes to the Palestinians
or any other peoples struggling for
freedom").
Clearly, Blacks are used to the idea
that the definition of "terrorist" or "mili-
tant" resides not only in the fact, but in the
power to make such definitions
operational.
(In fact, CIA spying on Black Americans in
the late 1960s and early 1970s was ra-
tionalized by then CIA Director Richard
Helms to his skeptical subordinates by
directing them to change the designation
of their operations from ones concemed
with "militant groups" to "Terrorism," The
Washington Post, September 8, 1979).
In the 1940s, the British considered the
Zionist movement led by the Irgun Zvei
Leumi as a "terrorist" organization, and
the present Israeli PrimeMinisterwas one
of its key leaders. Today, the PLO,which
considered itself at war with the Israelis,
is considered a "terrorist" organization
just as the Patriotic Front is considered
"terrorist" by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia sym-
pathizers, and the African National Con-
gress and the Pan African Congress are
considered "terrorist" by the South Afri-
cans. These labels find their way easily
into common usage by supporters of
Israel, South Africa and Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia in the United States today.
What is to some extent puzzling is that
theexperience of those who are supposed
to be professional foreign policymakers
has not led them to recognize that the ex-
treme claims of combatants-such as that
implied in Article 27 of the PLO Charter
that it would liquidate Israel-are a nec-
essary part of the psycho logical resources
of relatively powerless groups, and that
the process of achieving a stage of nego-
tiation requires a political understanding
of such issues as well as the literal inter-
pretation. The extraordinary position of
the United States is that it has been ma-
neuvered into a foreign policy position
based on the Israeli interpretations of
PLO objectives, and appears unwilling to
use its dominant position with regard to
Israel to moderate its behavior, or its view
of the world. For example, the result is, in
the words of a U. S. official in Lebanon,
the Israelis have become the oppressor in
the region through their merci less mi litary
assaults upon suspected PLO bases, uti-
lizing weapons provided by the United
States.
After the meetings, with the PLO and
Israeli representatives, Lowery explained
that they did not meet with these two ad-
versaries as negotiators schooled in the
details of the Middle East, but as "moral
ambassadors" seeking peace in the tradi-
tion of the legacy of Martin Luther King,Jr.
Still, the press and other members of
the Jewish community denounced the
SCLC delegation for this "foray into for-
eign policy," apparently ignorant of the
fact that Blacks had been involved in
U.S. foreign policy since 1869 with the
appointment of the first Black American
ambassador, and since 1919 when a
Black organization-the NAACP-spon-
sored W.E.B. DuBois in his formation of
the first Pan African Conference in Paris.
That conference had the specific inten-
tion of influencing U.S. policy toward a
just settlement of the African colonial
question as a part of the peace agree-
ments ending World War I. (See Jake C.
Miller, The Black Presence in American
Foreign Affairs, University Press of Amer-
ica, 1978; and Adekunle Ajala, Pan-
Atricanism: Evolution, Progress and Pros-
pects, Andre Deutsch, London, 1973).
It is worth noting that no substantial
period in the 20th Century has elapsed
when there was not an organized Black
group with the stated intention of influenc-
ing the outcome of U.S. policy toward
Africa, and many of their activities took
into account other areas of the world as
well.
As a continuation of this thrust, the
SCLC adroitly tied the issue of the Middle
East to Africa by pointing to growing rela-
tions between Israel and South Africa,
which has had a small but significant
Jewish population for nearly 50 years.
While this Jewish community has had to
tread lightly between the issues of its own
prosperity and opposition to apartheid,
the growing isolation of Israel from the
Middle East and Africa-since the 1967
war when most African countries broke 11
diplomatic relations with Israel- has
brought it into closer relations with South
Africa. For example, Israel is reported to
have provided South Africa with sophisti-
cated electronic equipment and techni-
cians to electrify its border with Mozam-
bique to stop the infiltration of liberation
fighters, and provided military equipment
such as sea-to-sea rockets for the South
African Navy.
On the other hand, South Africa has
supplied Israel with vitally needed en-
ergy supplies such as coal and uranium,
and the two countries have opened up
trade in a variety of other commodities
and signed air transport agreements fa-
cilitating trade and tourist travel arrange-
ments. Finally, there are rumors that the
two may be sharing nuclear technology,
given their mutual desire for the acquisi-
tion of substantial nuclear power fac iIities,
and similar security situations.
To continue with the events of Black
politics, at the larger August 22 meeting
of more than 100 delegates representing
various organizations, the level of anger
which issued forth from the participants
was strong and unmistakably blunt
against both Israel and the American
Jewish community for their role in the
Young affair, and for their opposition
to Black domestic causes. And while the
attendance and exchanges were remarka-
ble, the drafters of the statements worked
to tone down the fervor of the three state-
ments which were issued, while retaining
their content.
The statements, nevertheless, though
overlapping considerably, were relatively
substantive in pointing out (1) the contri-
bution of Andrew Young to U.S. foreign
policy and Black pride in his achieve-
ments, (2) the arrogance of Jews in chal-
lenging the right of Blacks to participate
in shaping American policy in any part of
the world, (3) the forgotten role of the late
Dr. Ralph Bunche.' and the assertion of a
role by Blacks in foreign policy matters in
view of the disproportionate impact of
negative foreign policy decisions on the
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12 Black community, (4) the abysmal role of
the State Department in its conduct of for-
eign policy and its inclusion of Blacks in
substantive decision-making roles-even
with regard to African affairs, and (5) the
Jewish defection in America from liberal
causes, as evidenced by their leadership
in the neo-conservative movement and
opposition to vital public policy issues af-
fecting Blacks."
In a subsequent meeting between rep-
resentative Black leaders and leaders of
the American Jewish community, Jews
were at pain to make two points: the first
is that they continued to deplore the legiti-
macy which Blacks had given to the
Palestine Liberation Organization, and
the second was that in a meeting called
by Robert Strauss (just one hour before
the Young resignation was announced)
with a representative group of Jewish or-
ganizations, most of them pointed out that
they did not favor the resignation of
Young, that they were more concerned
about the perceptible shift in U.S. policy
toward the Palestinians. Theodore Mann,
chairman of the Council of Presidents of
Jewish Organizations made this point in
subsequent press interviews.
But while the majority of Black leader-
ship had the purpose of subscribing to
the wishes of Andrew Young to attempt to
ameliorate any tensions between Blacks
and Jews caused by his departure, it was
also clear that a significant group per-
ceived of the series of events of the previ-
ous week as an opportunity to playa more
formidable role in the shaping of U.S. for-
eign policy and to initiate a strategy of
"bargaining" with the American Jews con-
cerning the continuing needs of Blacks
and the current role of Jewish leaders in
the American political economy. Noted
1 Dr. Bunche, former chairman of the Political Sci-
ence Department at Howard, and deputy secretary
general of the UN, won the Nobel Peace Prize for his
negotiations which led to the cease fire between the
Arab states and Israel in 1939.
2. As an example of this phenomenon, see a recent
book, Affirmative Discrimination, by Nathan Glazer, a
former leading American Jewish liberal, now a leader
in the neo-conservative movement. The book presents
a powerful indictment against affirmative action
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sociologist Dr. Kenneth Clark, in fact, de-
scribed the Black unity meetings as a
"declaration of independence."
Although in historical perspective it
might be viewed as a curious outcome
that the Congressional Black Caucus,
CBC, did not immediately issue a state-
ment in response to Young's resignation,
two factors account for this result.The first
is that most members of the CBC, includ-
ing the chairwoman, Cardiss Collins, were
either out of the city or the country during
the Congressional recess and could not
immediately organize to respond. But the
more important problem is that key mem-
bers of the group were fearful of any state-
mentwhichwould have reflected upon the
Jewish problem due to the financial and
electoral support Jews constituted in their
home districts and in the Congress. Here,
prominent exceptions who pushed for
forceful response were Ronald Dellums,
Parren Mitchell, Charles Diggs and
Walter Fauntroy, with all but Diggs issu-
ing individual statements.
Conclusion
Much of the speculation in the national
media and in the Black community has
focused on how the events described
above might affect the support by Blacks
for the renomination efforts of President
Carter, and what eventual dynamics
might result from the apparent breach be-
tween Blacks and Jews over the Middle
East.
To begin with, the question arises be-
cause of the signs previously surfacing
that Blacks, a vital constituency for Carter
in 1976, have been increasingly dissatis-
fied with the attention of his Administra-
tion to Black needs and the lack of policy-
directed social changes. The Carter
Administration has made its first priority
stemming the growing inflation, and al-
though Carter spokespersons point to
some accomplishments, the lack of suffi-
cient attention to Black and other minority
problems through massive intervention
policies has made Blacks strongly feel
the sting of unemployment and the rav-
ages of income loss and job immobility.
National opinion polls had already il-
lustrated significant Black losses of sup-
port for Carter and the traditional Black
leadership organizations had adopted a
"wait and see" posture toward his presi-
dential cand idacy in 1980. In add ition to
this, a recent poll by The Gallup Organi-
zation indicated that the Black approval
rating for Carter was about what it had
been before the Young resignation (37
percent), but one-fourth of those ques-
tioned said the Young affair had made
some difference in their view of the Presi-
dent, possibly signaling further defections
later.
While the main findings of the poll indi-
cated that the 532 Blacks interviewed
were uninterested or uninformed about
Middle East politics, most confirmed the
existence of tensions between Blacks and
Jews in America in the areas of quotas for
jobs or education, and Jewish business
operations in Black areas. (Newsweek,
September 3, 1979).
With the Black leadership focusing on
the Black-Jewish split due to the Young
affair, the issue of presidential responsi-
bility has faded into the background. This
may have been due, in no small measure,
to Young's statement that his resignation
was "non-negotiable" and his immediate
announcement of support for the Presi-
dent-as well as the reluctance of the
Black leadership to directly challenge the
President over the Young affair. The state-
ments "deplore" the President's accept-
ance of Young's resignation and question
irregularities in his treatment. And the
President's statement the following week
at EmoryUniversity contained no explana-
tions, rather he appeared more the arbiter
of the Black-Jewish fight than a man yield-
ing to pressures from the press, State
Department policy elite, the Israeli Gov-
ernment and the American Jewish com-
munity to fire Young. Perhaps the reason
for this is that, aswas suggested inNews-
week, presidential advisers consider the
departure of Young a plus for Carter's re-
election possibilities, because Carter
"demonstrated leadership" in his drive to
reposition his Administration for a second
assault upon the White House. (News-
week, August 27,1979).
In any case, there is the open question
considering meetings, such as the Black
Leadership Forum Summit in September,
and the National Black Political Conven-
tion early in 1980, whether Young's sup-
port for the President maps out a collision
course between him and a substantial
portion of Black America on the question
of symbolic versus substantive dividends
in exchange for the Black vote. Should
such a conflict materialize, the ultimate
meaning of the Young resignation is that
it set loose a powerful contender for the
political allegiance of Blacks in domestic
pol itics among the existing leadership
cadre.
Secondly, it is now a matter of common
parlance that the Young affair has had the
effect of both legitimizing the PLOamong
Blacks and making it possible for them to
discuss openly the dimensions of Black-
Jewish relations previously prohibited by
the fear of,withdrawal of Jewish support
and charges of "Black anti-Semitism." In
this, the willingness of Blacks to rally to
the support of the Palestinian people-as
a similarly oppressed people (described
by Young) through open contacts with the
PLO and other Arab groups-sets up a
serious responsibility for Blacks to be-
come more knowledgeable about the poli-
tics of the Middle East. Otherwise these
events would only constitute a temporary
response to the problem of an individual
Black andwou Id appear to have exp loited
the struggle of the Palestinian people for
the right to a homeland which was taken
away from them by force. This would cor-
rect the highly generalized level of the ini-
tial treatment of the Middle East problem
by Black leaders in their statements, and
cause them to reply on more substantive
inputs from scholars, politicians and oth-
ers, but especially the people of the
Middle East themselves.
Key subjects in this regard would in-
volve the Black response to such matters
as the history of the Middle East conflict
and the role of U.S. policy; the process of
the formation of the state of Israel and the
dispossession of the Palestinians; the
various agreements promulgated by the
Nixon/Ford and Carter Administrations
and especially the Camp David accords
and their implications; the nature of the
PLO, including the view of other Palestini-
ans toward that organization; the specific
definitions of "autonomy" rather than
statehood; the role of Egypt in the peace
process; the attitude of other Arab states
toward the Camp David accords; the PLO
and the Palestinian peoples in their areas;
the position of Blacks on UN. resolutions
relating to the Midd Ie East; the relation-
ship of the Middle East problem to Africa;
the stakes of the American Black commu-
nity in the U.S. reliance on the Middle
East nations for oi I; and, the function of
Israel in the strategic interest of the West-
em states-among many others.
Here, the call by Young, during his
early September leadership of a Presi-
dential trade mission to Africa, for African
countries to restore diplomatic and other
relations with Israel bears serious con-
sideration. The most important question is
why, and what would be the stakes in-
volved. For example, shouldn't African
countries insist upon their own doctrine of
Israel's recognition of a state for the
Palestinian people, the cessation of com-
mando and bombing raids into Lebanon,
compliance with the mandatory UN. arms
embargo against South Africa (including
the cessation of all nuclear relationships)
and cessation of the supply of military
equipment to the so-called Zimbabwe/
Rhodesia, and U.S. revocation of the
doctrine of no-contact with the PLO? It
would appear that African states might
question such a suggestion of renewed
relations with Israel as inconsistent with
their previous role in the Middle Eastcon-
flict and overly gratuitious at best.
(The suggestion by Young of the renewal
of African ties with Israel was first put to
President William Tolbert of Liberia last
month. But while Tolbert was intially en-
thusiastic, he quickly grew cautious about
the implications of such a proposal, es-
pecially since several key African states
were simultaneously at the Havana non-
aligned nations meeting where they
joined in the denunciations of the Camp
David accords, and in putting Egypt's
membership in that organization on a
probationary status. It is predictable that
such a suggestion would have a poor re-
ception in Africa at this time. At best the
value of such a proposal is highly de-
visive to African unity).
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Finally, it is doubtful that either the resig-
nation of Andrew Young or the salience of
Middle East politics will continue to have
high priority in the context of the Ameri-
can Blackagenda.lt is relatively predicta-
ble that as the specific issues in the Mid-
dle East conflict, presidential politics and
the Jewish-Black debate run their course,
divisions will occur within the ranks of the
temporari Iyunified Black leadership itself.
In fact, it would be less than accurate to
suggest that such differences of opinion
and approach will not be dominant as one
confronts the question of how the status of
Blacks might be improved in relation to
the politics of 1980 as the immediate
arena.
The Black leadership, however, has
shown the capacity for mobilization and a
surprising degree of unanimity in its
recognition of the Jewish problem. This
problem, however, may be seen more
clearly as a response to neo-conservatism
itself rather than a rise in anti-Jewish
sentiment, but to that extent a formidable
onus rests upon the Jewish leadership of
this movement and the challenge to it by
other Jews sti II committed to fundamental
social change. This fact should result in
dialogue because of the hard fact that,
despite the significant Islamic commu-
nity among Blacks, Arab states have been
less than sensitive to Black needs or po-
tential themselves and substantially in-
sensitive to the needs of Africans on the
continent who are suffering from the im-
pact of European colonialism com-
pounded by high oil prices. Arab states
are said to playa significant role in sup-
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14 plying South Africa with oil and in pur-
chasing South African gold which keeps
the South African economy afloat. It is
possible to predict, because many Arabs
practice the same racism as Europeans,
that they will not replace, nor indeed be
able to replace the relationship between
Blacks and Jews in America.
Yet, organizations representing the two
million Arab-Americans have recently
shown a welcome willingness to enter
into a mutually beneficial dialogue with
Blacks. Such a dialogue might possibly
convey toArabs the depth of Black feeling
with regard to these important issues.
In the short run, however, recognizing
that some issues may be irreconcilable,
a way must be found to transform the
capac ity for mobil ization among Blacks in
this instance to confront both traditional
domestic concerns where both American-
Arabs and Jews might alternately be part
of a coalition with Blacks, and to map out
a broader international agenda which
might encompass wider issues of life and
death-such as the size of the military
budget and its use in fomenting weapons
of destruction, the arms race with the
Soviet Union and attendant political prob-
lems surrounding the limitation of strate-
gic arms, the state of the international
economy and its relation to the economic
status of Blacks and other broad issues.
The resignation of Andrew Young is an
unfortunate event because of his success
in raising difficult questions to test the
standards of human rights proposed as
the basis for U.S. policy around theworld,
and because heestabl ished relations with
Africa which have helped to concretize
the interests of all Blacks.
But the real legacy of his resignation
maywell be its catalytic effect in a process
of political development whereby Blacks
have been enabled to see more clearly
the shape of their own interests both in
domestic and in international politics. 0
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